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NOTES
CHILD ABUSE: EXCEPTION To THE ANTI-MARITAL FACTS
United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975).

PRIVILEGE

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
a case of first impression among the federal courts,' considered
whether the federally recognized anti-marital facts privilege which
bars the adverse testimony of one spouse against the other should
be applied where the defendant is charged with a crime against the
2
child of either spouse. By its holding in United States v. Allery, the
court broadened the established exception to the anti-marital facts
privilege, which federal courts had previously limited to offenses
committed against the person or property of the testifying spouse.
The appellant had been charged with the rape and incest of his
twelve-year-old daughter and was convicted of the lesser charge of
attempted rape in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 11531 and § 12-30-01 of
the North Dakota Century Code. He appealed his conviction on two
grounds,' his major contention being that by permitting his wife to
testify against him the trial court had violated the common law
anti-marital facts privilege, which one spouse could invoke to bar
the other spouse's adverse testimony. 5 The latter was one of three
types of rules which the common law applied to the testimony of
husband and wife. 6
1. See United States v. Shipp, 409 F.2d 33, 35 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 764
(1969).
2. 44 U.S.L.W. 2291 (8th Cir. Dec. 9, 1975).
3. Federal jurisdiction existed by virtue of the fact that appellant had been charged
with an offense committed on an Indian reservation.
4. His first contention on appeal was that state evidentiary rules should have controlled
his federal criminal prosecution and that therefore his wife's testimony was barred by North
Dakota Century Code § 31-01-02 which makes one spouse incompetent to testify for or
against the other spouse without the latter's consent with certain exceptions not applicable
to the instant case. The court disposed of this issue summarily by pointing to Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
. . . The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses
shall be governed, except when an act of Congress on these rules otherwise provide by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience.
At the time of Allery's trial and sentencing Rule 26 controlled; however, as of July 1, 1975,
the Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence, competency of witnesses
and privileges. See I D. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence XI (1975). FED. R.
EVID. 501 essentially incorporates the above-quoted language of Rule 26 which has since been
deleted from that rule. See discussion infra at 212-13.
5. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2227-2245 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
8 WIGMOREI; 97 C.J.S. Witnesses §§ 75-104 (1957).
6. Another rule disqualified one spouse from testifying in favor of the other one. 2
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 488 (statutes), 606-620 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as 2
211
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Although the wife's incompetency to testify against her husband was firmly established at common law, all states have enacted
statutes defining the scope of the privilege.7 An exception to the
privilege, based on "necessity," was recognized even at common law
when the husband had been charged with a crime against the wife's
person.' Some modem state statutes have formulated the exception
so as to allow a spouse's testimony whenever one has committed a
crime against the other, while others have gone further and allowed
such testimony in prosecutions for offenses such as bigamy, adultery, desertion, and child abuse, as well as in abandonment and
support proceedings.' Federal courts have likewise broadly construed the "necessity" exception.' 0 However, prior to United States
v. Allery no federal court had ever extended it to cases where the
defendant was charged with a crime against a child of one of the
spouses.
In October, 1971, the Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference and the Standing Commission on Rules of Practice and
Procedure submitted to the United States Supreme Court its final
draft of the proposed uniform rules of evidence for use in federal
courts." Included in these rules was rule 505 defining the husbandwife privilege as follows:
(a)
ing has a
(c)
ceedings

General rule of privilege. An accused in a criminal proceedprivilege to prevent his spouse from testifying against him.
Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule (1) in proin which one spouse is charged with a crime against the

person or property of the other or of a child of either. .

.

added) 2

. (emphasis

WIGMOREJ; 97 C.J.S. Witnesses §§ 75-104 (1957). This rule has been altered or abolished in

almost every state; see 2 WIGMORE, supra; C.

McCORMICK, EVIDENCE

§ 66 (2d ed. 1972); and

in the federal courts by Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
The third type of privilege prevents a spouse from testifying about any confidential
communication between husband and wife or, in some states, any information gained on
account of the marital relation. 8 WIGMORE § 2332-2341; DEC. DIGEST, Witnesses §§ 187-195;
C.J.S. Witnesses 88 266-275.
7. See, Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal

Cases Where the Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Communications: Modern
Trend, 38 VA. L. REV. 359, 362 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Note, Competency].

8.

E.g., 1 BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES

443 (1965); 8

WIGMORE

§ 2239.

9. See, Note, Competency 362, 365; 8 WIGMORE § 2240.
10. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960); Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838
(8th Cir. 1949) (violation of the Mann Act); Herman v. United States, 220 F.2d 219 (4th Cir.
1955) (fraud against the testifying spouse); United States v. Ryno, 130 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Cal.
1955), aff'd on other grounds, 232 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1956) (adultery).
11. S. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) reported in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG
& AD. NEWS at 7052 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
12. 2 D. WEINSTEIN, M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 505-1 (1975).
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This provision was among the proposed new rules of evidence endorsed by the Supreme Court and sent by Chief Justice Burger to
Congress for approval on February 5, 1973.'1 Congress chose not to
adopt rule 505, deciding instead to eliminate all of the specific privilege rules submitted by the Court and substitute rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence" which authorized the federal courts to
apply testimonial privilege according to "the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience.""
I.

THE

Allery

COURT'S HOLDING

On the basis of its examination of the legislative history of
the rejection of proposed rule 505, the Allery court did not find
congressional disapproval of the suggested expansion but rather a
desire to allow federal courts to make such substantive changes on
a case-by-case basis." Congress was apparently concerned primarily
with the effect the proposed privilege rules would have on civil
suits and on forum shopping in diversity cases. 7
Satisfied that it had been mandated to modify federal common
law privileges when "reason and experience" require it, the court
proceeded to examine the policies underlying the marital privilege
invoked by appellant. Although it did not dispute the validity of the
privilege as a means of "fostering family peace,"'" the majority
13. The Supreme Court has been authorized by various enabling acts (18 U.S.C. §§
3402, 3771, 3772; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075) to promulgate, subject to congressional approval,
rules governing procedure in federal courts.
14. See Senate Report at 7051-59.
15. The full text of rule 501 reads:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with State law.
16. The relevant portion of the Senate report states:
- It should be clearly understood that, in approving this general rule as to privileges,
the action of Congress should not be understood as disapproving any recognition of a
psychiatrist-patient, or husband-wife, or any other of the enumerated privileges contained in the Supreme Court rules. Rather our action should be understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relationship and
other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Senate Report at 7059.
17. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) reported in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7082-83.
18. 526 F.2d at 1365.
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found five reasons why the privilege should no longer be applied in
child abuse cases:
(1) A serious crime against a child offends not only family
harmony but society as well;
(2) Parental testimony is often vital to successful prosecution
of child abuse cases;
(3) The rule " 'impedes the discovery of truth in a court of law
and therefore impedes as well the doing of justice' ,,;9
(4) Strong state decisional authority supports the proposi20
tion;
(5) In the past fifteen years at least eleven state legislatures
have seen fit to incorporate the child-abuse-neglect exception into
their statutes defining the anti-marital facts privileges.2'
Although Judge Henley, dissenting, agreed with the majority's
assertion that the court had a duty to examine the policies behind
federal common law privileges and to make any modifications or
amendments dictated by reason, he remained unconvinced that the
exception should be broadened to encompass child abuse cases. He
pointed out that as recently as 1958 the Supreme Court had expressed its approval of the marital privilege fact rule and refused to
limit its scope:
There is still a widespread belief, grounded on present conditions,
that the law should not force or encourage testimony which might
alienate husband and wife, or further inflame existing domestic dif19. United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d at 1366 citing Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S.
74, 81 (1958) (Stewart, J. concurring).
20. See, e.g., Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108, 401 P.2d 259 (1965) (murder by one
spouse of the other spouse's child held to be equivalent of crime committed against that
spouse making the husband-wife privilege inapplicable); People v. Miller, 16 Mich. 647, 168
N.W.2d 408 (1969) (mother of victim in statutory rape prosecution held to be a proper and
competent witness under statute relating to husband and wife as witnesses for or against one
another); State v. Kollenborn, 304 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1957) (in prosecution of husband for
assault on their minor child, wife could testify for the state); People v. Allman, 342 N.Y.S.2d
896, 41 A.D.2d 325 (1973) (statute permitted testimony of one spouse against the other in
child-abuse prosecution; however, the court said it would admit the wife's testimony even if
the statute had not removed the privilege); Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1960)
(wife permitted to testify against husband in prosecution for statutory rape of their daughter
because the rape of her child is a special wrong to the wife).
21. See, e.g., Indiana, IND. CODE § 12-3-4.155 (1971); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.8
(1965); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(5) (Baldwin 1965); Louisiana, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:403F (1964); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2162 (1961);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (1969); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1505 (Supp.
1974); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:43 (Supp. 1973); North Dakota, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 50-25-05 (1965), repealed and supplemented by § 50-25.1-10 (1975); South
Dakota, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 19-2-1 (1967); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
5.60.060 (1965).
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to the
ferences. Under these circumstances we are unable to subscribe
22
idea that several centuries should now be abandoned.
However, in making this argument, Judge Henley overlooks the fact
that the Supreme Court has more recently placed its stamp of approval on the child abuse exception to the marital privilege by its
adoption of proposed rule 505.
Noting that Congress had directed that changes in privilege
rules should be made on a case-by-case basis, Judge Henley argued
that this was not a case in which compelling considerations justified
expanding the exception. Not only was the victim old enough and
otherwise competent to testify, but other witnesses (her three
sisters) were also available and competent. All did in fact testify.
The wife's testimony was mainly cumulative, highly prejudicial to
the husband, and not essential to the prosecution's case. While the
majority did not address this issue, it apparently felt that the strong
policy reasons favoring abrogation of the privilege in child abuse
cases justified expanding the "necessity" exception even in a case
where arguably the wife's testimony was not crucial to successful
prosectuion. Thus, unlike the dissent, the majority did not argue
the facts but stressed the underlying policy objectives.
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

Background

Although 60,000 incidences of child abuse were reported to have
occurred in a single year in the United States,2 3 and 141,000 child
neglect cases were filed in 1972,24 such figures are said to represent
no more than the "tip of the iceberg."'2 - The actual incidence of child
abuse and neglect" has been estimated to be between 665,000 and
1,675,000 per year.2 7 Whatever the true figures are, it is clear that
22. United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d at 1367 citing Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S.
74, 78-79 (1958).
23. Hearings on S. 1191 Before the Subcomm. on Children and Youth of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. at 497-505 (1973).
24. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, Juv. CT. STATISTICs 14, table 11 (1972)
(table for 1972).
25. V. FONTANA, THE MALTREATED CHILD 37 (1971) [hereinafter cited as FONrANA].
26. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 3 (Jan. 31,
1974) defines "child abuse and neglect" as follows:
[Tihe physical or mental injury, sexual abuse, negligent treatment or maltreatment
of a child under the age of 18 by a person who is responsible for the child's welfare
under circumstances which indicate that the child's health or well-being is harmed or
threatened ther6by. ...
27. Light, Abused and Neglected Children in America: A Study of Alternative Policies,
43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 556, 567 (1972).
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child abuse is a major social concern. The legislative response to
the problem indicates the seriousness with which it is viewed:
within the brief span of 1963-1967 all fifty states as well as the
District of Columbia and the Virgin Isalnds enacted "Battered
Child Reporting Laws." 28 Reporting laws are designed to provide a
means of informing authorities of suspected cases of abuse. Most of
these statutes have provisions abrogating the husband-wife privilege in child abuse or neglect reports."9
According to a nationwide survey conducted by Brandeis University in 1968,30 child abuse occurs most often at home, with biological or step-parents the abusers in 84% of the cases. The study also
shows that other family members are usually present, whereas outsiders rarely are-a fact which would seen to make it important that
all family members mature enough to testify be permitted to do so.
B.

Evidentiary Problems

Authorities generally recognize that the prosecution of child
abuse cases is plagued with particularly difficult evidentiary problems 31 due largely to the fact that this is a low-visibility crime typically involving the parent-child bond and victimizing children
under three.32 Not only do the vast majority of criminal prosecutions
fail for insufficiency of evidence, but so do most civil dependency
proceedings,3 even though a lower standard of proof prevails than
in criminal cases.3 4 The consequences are often tragic, for in most
cases the courts have no choice but to return the child to its home
28. For a listing of the statutes, see Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape
of Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1967).
29. For a listing of such statutes, see Fraser, PragmaticAlternative to CurrentLegislative Approaches, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 112-13 (1974).
30. D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 134 (1970).
31. Belgrad, The Problem of the Battered Child, 2 MD. L.F. 37, 47 (1972); Burke,
Evidentiary Problems of Proof of Child Abuse Cases: Why Family and Juvenile Courts Fail,
13 J. OF FAM. L. 819, 827 (1973-74) [hereinafter cited as Burke]; McKenna, A Case Study of
Child Abuse: A Former Prosecutor's View, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 168 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as McKenna]; Note, An Appraisal of New York's Statutory Response to the Problem
of Child Abuse, 7 COLUM. J.L. & Soc'y 51, 63 (1971); Comment, Evidentiary Problems in
Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 63 GEo. L.J. 257, 259-63 (1974).
32. Brown, The Battered Baby, 76 CHI. MEDICINE No. 6 (1973), presented at the Chicago
Medical Society Midwest Clinical Conference, March 11, 1972.
33. FONTANA, supra note 25 at 46; Burke, supra note 31 at 828.
34. The standard of proof in criminal cases is "beyond a reasonable doubt." 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as 9 WIGMORE]; 22A C.J.S. Criminal
Law §§ 566-578 (1961); whereas in civil cases it is generally "a preponderance of evidence;"
9 WIGMORE § 2498; 32A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 1021, 1022 (1964); however, in some civil cases a
more exacting measure of persuasion may be required such as "clear and convincing evidence;" In re J.Z. 190 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1971) (parental termination proceedings).
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where, if it has in fact been previously abused, it has a 50% chance
of being killed or injured upon return. 5 An unsuccessful prosecution
may not only render the court powerless to provide the "battered
child" with protective services, but the "battering parent" is not
given the assistance he or she may need to break the vicious cycle
of abuse. Many battering parents were battered children them3
selves. 1
Although direct testimonial evidence is often crucial to successful prosecution in a child abuse case, it is frequently not available.
"Hostile relatives, ignorant and hostile children, and neighbors who
refuse to get involved at all ' 37 obstruct the fact-finding process.
Even if the victim is not killed and is otherwise competent to testify,
his testimony, as well as that of any siblings who witnessed the
injury, is likely to be of little or no value for a variety of reasons.
Children are impressionable and susceptible to parental suggestion
and intimidation. In spite of past abuse suffered at the hands of
their parents, they may seek to protect them and may still trust
them more than the strangers (e.g., the prosecutor, or social worker)
sent to interview them. They may fear additional and more severe
punishment. 3 Lastly, they may suffer from distorted perception
because to them severe beatings and other forms of abuse are routine.3 1 Putting a child on the stand who is reluctant or afraid to
testify and pressing him for answers risks jury alienation. The prosecutor is thus faced with the dilemma of choosing between not using
the testimony of hostile and uncooperative children even though
they may be the only eyewitnesses to the crime or treading very
delicately and failing to elicit meaningful information. Either approach may be fatal to the state's case.40
supra note 25 at 46; Burke, supra note 31 at 828.
Brown, Fox, Hubbard, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Battered Child Syndrome,
50 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 45, 49 (1973).
37. McKenna, supra note 31 at 168.
38. Comment, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 63 GEo.
L.J. 257, 259, 260 (1974).
39. This aspect of the problem of obtaining state's witnesses is discussed by a former
prosecutor who found the victim's brother and sister hostile and uncooperative even though
their sister had died a slow and excruciatingly painful death at the hands of their parents.
To them there was nothing wrong with their mother's torture of their nine-year-old
sister. The children discounted their sister's screams of agony as either the natural
consequence of having been 'bad' or sheer malingering. Their attitude was that she got
what she deserved because she 'wouldn't listen.'
McKenna, supra note 31 at 169.
40. Fear of arousing jury alienation forced McKenna to abandon questioning the
fourteen-year-old sister of the deceased and completely refrain from putting any of the other
children on the stand. McKenna, supra note 31 at 169.
35.
36.

FONTANA,
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Thus, unless the defendant admits that he intentionally injured
the child, conviction may hinge on the testimony of a spouse who
witnessed the event or has other knowledge relevant to the case. If
the innocent spouse is barred from testifying by invocation of the
anti-marital facts privilege, the state may be left to prove its case
solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence."
III.

THE CASE AGAINST SPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN CHILD ABUSE CASES

Traditionally, four reasons have been given to support the antimarital facts privilege:
(1) Lord Coke's postulate that husband and wife "are two
souls in one flesh;" 4
(2) The public policy of promoting and preserving domestic
harmony;43
(3) The strong repugnance against convicting a person on the
testimony of one who shares the secrets of his private life and lives
under the same roof with him;44
(4) The likelihood that the testimony will be perjurious because the husband and wife's "interests are absolutely the same, nor
against the other. . .. -"' and "their being so nearly connected, they
are supposed to have such a bias on their minds that they are not
to be permitted to give evidence either for or against each other. 46
As the Allery court wisely recognized, it cannot be seriously contended that any of these reasons outweighs society's interests in
protecting children from parental abuse. Professor Wigmore has
characterized Lord Coke's pronouncement as "medieval scholasticism . . . doubtful in its morality and narrow in its view of human
nature."47 Always based on a legal fiction, contemporary notions
about the marital relation and the roles of the sexes deprives it of
all force.
Where a parent has battered or raped his child, it is specious
41. One case described the Standard for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence as follows: The facts must "form a complete chain which, in the light of the evidence as a whole,
leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any
reasonable inference other than that of guilt.
State v. DeZeler, 230 Minn. 39, 52, 41
N.W.2d 313, 322 (1950).
42. COKE, COMMENTARY ON LITrLETON *6b.
43. Stapleton v. Crofts, 18 Q.B. 367, 370, 118 Eng. Rep. 137, 138 (1852); Pringle v.
Pringle, 59 Pa. 281, 288 (1868).
44. Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408, 413 (1867).
45. J. BULLER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw RELATIVE To TRIALS AT Nisi PRIUs 270 (1767),
286a (7th ed., Bridgman, 1817).
46. Davis v. Dinwoody, 4 Term R. 678, 679, 100 Eng. Rep. 1241 (K.B. 1792).
47. 8 WIGMORE § 2228.
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to argue that preventing the innocent spouse from testifying will
contribute to family harmony. "A serious crime against a child is
an offense against that family harmony and to society as well."" To
raise the shield of family harmony in order to protect a parent who
has deliberately brutalized his child as to pervert the goals of the
judicial system. Such behavior is as destructive to the marital relationship as injury of one spouse by the other, a situation which falls
within the "necessity" exception recognized at common law.49 It is
unlikely that elimination of the anti-marital facts privilege will be
found to loom heavily as a factor in our spiraling divorce rate. 0
Certainly when balanced against the benefit to society gained by
successful prosecution of such cases, the alleged injury to the marital relationship seems trivial indeed.
Where the innocent spouse's testimony may be crucial to conviction "any public 'repugnance' . . . would more properly be directed at a rule of law which excluded the wife's testimony, rather
than at its admittance."'" A wrongdoer's interest in keeping secret
his private life fades where the secret he seeks to conceal is that he
abuses his child. It is a curious policy which would allow a spouse
to batter his child and then prevent the other from testifying against
him. As Professor Wigmore has aptly stated, "the law. . . does not
.proceed by sentiment, but aims at justice."5 2 A feeling of "repugnance" is no ground for interfering with the duty of courts to do
justice and ascertain the truth.
As for the supposed likelihood that the testimony will be perjurious, it would seem that a spouse who voluntarily testifies is more
likely to be motivated by a desire to protect his/her child from
further abuse than to protect his/her spouse from conviction. The
perjury argument is based on the untenable proposition that, as a
general rule, loyalty to one's spouse outweighs concern for the welfare of one's child. In such a case the interests of the spouses can
no longer be held to be identical so as to make fear of perjury a valid
reason for excluding a spouse's testimony. But even if the witnessing
spouse is compelled to testify, the mere possibility of perjury is not
48. United States v. Allery.
49. See p. 212 supra.
50. The "family harmony'. argument, like the other ones used to support the antimarital facts privilege, is essentially a relic of the seventeenth century. Itmay have had force
then when a special act of Parliament was required to obtain a divorce so that the more
expedient course was to preserve the marriage at all costs, but it loses much of its vitality in
today's world where divorce is readily available and frequently resorted to.
51. State v. Kollenborn, 304 S.W.2d 855, 860-61 (Mo. 1957).
52. 8 WIGMORE § 2228.
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a valid ground for barring that testimony altogether. The possibility
of perjury exists in all cases and is insufficient to justify the harsh
result often occasioned by exclusion of such evidence.
All of the public policy reasons which support the "necessity"
exception when the crime is committed by one spouse against the
other apply with equal force here. "The rape of the wife's child not
only impairs the conjugal relation but is a special wrong to the wife
and affects her directly and differently than that wrong suffered by
the public in general." 53 She undoubtedly suffers as much, if not
more than if her own person had been attacked. Thus, it takes no
great stretch of the imagination to conclude that such an offense is
a crime against the innocent spouse and on that basis include it in
the established exception as a number of state courts54 have done.
Given the widespread incidence and tragic consequences of
child abuse,5 5 it would seem incumbent upon the judiciary and the
legislatures to devise effective means of dealing with the problem.
This necessarily entails removal of evidentiary roadblocks to the
courts' receipt of information and to successful prosecution. The
insupportability of the traditional arguments when applied to child
abuse prosecutions, coupled with the general trend to relax rules of
witnesses' incompetence, 5 and the congressional directive to revise
such privileges as required mandate the elimination of the antimarital facts privilege in child abuse cases. It is hoped that the other
federal courts, if given the opportunity, will follow the lead of the
Allery court and remove this anachronistic obstruction to ascertainment of the truth.
Dalma Grandjean
53. Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280, 284 (Wyo. 1960).
54. Cases cited note 20 supra.
55. Approximately 10% of hospitalized child abuse victims die as a result of their
injuries. Others suffer permanent physical disability, mental retardation, emotional disturbances or personality disorders. In addition, the likelihood is great that those who survive will
grow up into another generation of child abusers. Brown, Fox, Hubbard, supra note 36 at 4950.
56. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
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